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ANTI-MISCEGENATION LAWS IN THE
UNITED STATES
The word "miscegenation" is not included in the everyday
vocabulary of a large part of our citizenry, but there are
nonetheless laws in twenty-nine states prohibiting misce-
genation. Etymologically, the term means intermarriage
of persons of different races; when used in this paper, how-
ever, the word has reference to marriage between whites
and non-whites.
Without suggesting an opinion on the desirability of anti-
miscegenation laws, the writer proposes to sketch the pro-
visions and effects of the present statutes on the subject.
Various questions then arise: what is the purpose of such
statutes and how effectively are they accomplishing that
purpose? Also, what are the legal problems created in
applying these laws?
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ANTI-MIsCFGENATION LAWS IN THE U. S.
I. Provisions and Effects of Present Laws
The preceding chart presents a panorama of the statutory
law of the twenty-nine states that have taken steps to pre-
vent miscegenation. As one will note, the laws are about
as varied as they are numerous; they disclose differing defi-
nitions of those in the prohibited class, the emphasis as to
persons in this class significantly shifting with the geo-
graphical location of the states. All these states prohibit
Negro-white marriages. Fourteen states, chiefly west of
the Mississippi, forbid intermarriage of white and Mongol-
oid persons.1 Three states, Louisiana, North Carolina, and
Oklahoma prohibit Negro-Indian intermarriage. 2  Four
states forbid Indian-white marriages s Six states consider
racial intermarriage with such abhorrence that its prohi-
bition is provided for in their Constitutions.
4
In contrast to the common law rule that issue of a void
marriage are illegitimate, many states have statutes legiti-
mating such issue. However, some legitimation statutes have
been interpreted not to apply to children of miscegenous
marriages; others, as indicated on the chart, have not been
construed as to this point. Although the status of the issue
is uncertain in many states, the marriages themselves seem
generally to be void ab initio and not merely voidable.
I Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. There
may be some question as to Georgia and Louisiana. Some of the statutes
specify the particular Mongolians prohibited, such as Nebraska, and
South Dakota.
Malay-white marriages prohibited in Arizona, Maryland, Nevada,
South Dakota, Utah, Wyoming, and possibly Georgia and Louisiana.
2 Regarding the Oklahoma statute, it is explained that one motive
for prohibiting Negro-Indian marriages, was to prevent Negroes from
sharing the wealth of those Indians who owned rich oil lands. SchuY-
ler, Racial Intermarriage in the United States, 16 (1929).
Regarding the North Carolina statute, the statute is alleged to be
connected with a legend that the Cherokee Indians of Robeson County
are descendants of the Croatan Indians who, as the legend has it, inter-
married with members of the Lost Colony of Sir Walter Raleigh;
therefore, these present Cherokees are part white, and any Negro-
Indian marriage in this instance would also be Negro-white intermar-
riage. Stephenson, Race Distinctions in American Law. 90 (1910).
'North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, and Virginia. Possibly
Georgia and Louisiana.
' Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina,
and Tennessee.
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II. Sociological Background
There is no categorical explanation for anti-miscegena-
tion legislation. To attempt such explanation is to become
enmeshed in one of the many aspects of the American social
milieu. The inconsistency among the statutes in the selec-
tion of the minority groups indicates the localization of
certain prejudices in this country and collectively, the stat-
utes act as indicators for the animosities nurtured by groups
in control in various states. On a national level, however,
the picture is incomplete. The absence of anti-miscegena-
tion statutes in some states should not be considered as
evidence that such marriages are approved there or that
there is a popular indifference to them. Rather, the lack of
such laws frequently reflects the fact that Negroes and
Orientals are a negligible part of the population in these
states, and that intermarriages are so few that the question
can be ignored. "Moreover, the absence of such legislation
is a source of some pride and it gives a certain feeling of
self-righteousness that is luxuriously pleasing."5
The passing of the frontier, which provided one method
of escape for the minority groups, and the ever increasing
occasion for social contact in our present mobile society,
serve as catalysts to the inter-group reaction and increase
the awareness of the fact that some groups have not assim-
ilated in certain areas. The opportunity of assimilation,
which in the ultimate sense must include amalgamation, has
been extended to Jewish, Italian and other white minorities;
5 Reuter, Race Mtture, 101 (1931). At page 103 the author states
that in recent years there have been attempts to pass laws prohibiting
the ntermarriage of Negroes and whites in Wisconsin, Massachusetts,
Washington, Kansas, Minnesota, Iowa, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, and New York.
"The lack of restrictive legislation on racial Intermarriage in
eighteen states and the District of Columbia does not mean that quasi-
legal devises to frustrate those marriages are absent. In northern
states, where there are no intermarriage statutes, judges often refuse
to issue licenses to racially divergent couples. Likewise, in the state
of Washington, the county auditor whose task it Is to determine whether
or not the mentality of applicants for marriage licenses is suitable,
often uses this power to deny licenses to potential racial intermar-
riage. In at least one other state, New Jersey, mental tests have also
been used to prevent racial intermarriages." Barron, People Who Inter-
marry, 56 (1946).
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but colored groups-Black, Brown, Yellow and to a lesser
extent Red-are considered unassimilable, and are denied
intermarriage with whites.
The underlying animosity to colored minorities can be
partially attributed to a desire in white groups to maintain
economic and social advantages. Independent of this de-
sire is a wish to avoid the physical consequences which are
thought to flow from racial inter-marriage. Thus, as one
court put it in upholding the constitutionality of an anti-
miscegenation statute:
"The amalgamation of the races is not only unnatural
but is always productive of deplorable results." 6
At times the statutes depart from purely social and economic
considerations. The Georgia statute includes within its
prohibition, the marriage of whites with Asiatic Indians.
What challenge could this minority offer to the economic
and social superiority of Georgia whites? Similarly, the
Western states prohibit Negro-white marriages. Yet the
1940 census shows that the Negroes constitute less than one
per cent of the population of Montana, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Wyoming, Nevada, and Oregon. However useful
"color" may be as an instrument for stratification, what
role does it play where the "inferior caste" constitutes less
than one per cent of the population?
The peculiarities of inclusion or ex'3lusion of various
racial groups in anti-miscegenation statutes seem due to
fortuitious historical events. Among such events may be
mentioned the migration into the sthte og population groups
from regions in which intense racial attitudes are dominant,
the rise to power of political leaders holding such attitudes,
and a local upsurge of racial feeling due to dramatic inci-
dents of inter-group conflict in the particular state.
Considering that over half of the states have legislation
designed to prevent miscegenation, it could reasonably be
supposed that a rather formidable problem in that connec-
tion existed. Yet studies made of the extent of racial inter-
marriage in the United States indicate that it is very small;
' Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321, 324 (1869). Of similar import, Ford v.
State, 53 Ala. 150 (1875); Hoover v. State, 59 Ala. 57 (1877); Kennedy
v. State, 76 N.C. 251. (1877); State v. Frasher, 3 Tex. App. 262 (1877).
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of necessity, these studies must be made in states with no
prohibitions against such marriages. The bulk of such
studies deal with Negro-white intermarriages. One of the
later studies of the city of Boston for the years 1914-38
reveals that of all marriages involving whites, the percent-
age of Negro-white was .13, and for the same period there
were 276 Negro-white marriages, which was 3.9 per cent
of all marriages involving Negroes.' A study of New York,
exclusive of New York City, for the years 1916-37 revealed
that there were 569 Negro-white marriages which accounted
for 2.9 per cent of all marriages involving Negroes., Of
course, any study in the field is not completely reliable, for
the definition of "Negro" may vary with the study con-
ducted.
One interesting survey reveals that the tendency to inter-
marry appears to vary according to sex. Of 3,131 cases of
Negro racial intermarriage in twenty-two American cities,
approximately four-fifths were of the Negro male-white
female type.9 From these statistics one can conclude that
the Negro male racially intermarries more frequently than
does the Negro female and that the converse is true with
whites. According to current population figures, the num-
ber of white females continues to exceed the number of
males, a trend which may be accentuated further by war
casualties. Thus, pressure is placed upon the mass of un-
married white females to search further for husbands, a
factor which may induce increasing readiness on the part
of some to enter into miscegenous unions. Conversely, the
white male may feel less resentment toward a miscegenous
marriage which only slightly drains the vast reservoir of
marriageable females. Still, since Negro females also out-
number Negro males, the Negro man is not under pressure to
range afield seeking a white mate. Whether these demo-
graphic trends will cancel out or increase the pressure to-
ward miscegenation cannot be foretold.
In states where the social caste feeling is especially strong
it is doubtful that statutes are needed to prevent miscegena-
, MRneberg, Oharacteritics of the American Negro, 277, table 4,
(1944).
lbid, 280, table 7.
* Barron, op cit., 116-117.
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tion. - Probably their chief function -is to reenforce and
crystallize" public sentiment, which may differ from the
sentiments held by particilarindividuals. Also, the stat-
utes may act as a deterrent to prevent "colored" persons
from attempting to intermarry with whites even though
their physical characteristics would allow them to pass the
color line;, the statutes remind them of the possible painful
consequences to self ,and family if -their heredity ' is dis-
covered.
III. Conflict of Laws Problems
The" proximity of states that do not interfere with racial
intermarriage to those states that do, presents an interest-
ing and complicated conflict of laws question, that has been
variously'rsolved by the states having interdictions against
such marriages.10 Suppose residents of a state forbidding
miscegenation jouriey to another state condoning it, marry,
and then return to their former home. In such instances,
it is generally held that the evasion will not bar a criminal
prosecution for illegal cohabitation in the domiciliary state,
nor will the marriage be valid for any purpose there. 1
Eighteen of the states have statutes with respect to mar-
riage evasion; of these, three-Indiana, Virginia and West
Virginia-require a special intent to evade local law.12
Those states which allow their anti-miscegenation laws to
be evaded by one who has carfare to another state are keep-
ing nullities on the statute books.' s
10 "Although as a general rule, validity of a marriage is determined
by the law of the place where it was entered into, so that a marriage
valid there is generally to be regarded as valid everywhere, there are
recognized exceptions to this rule, principal among which are (1)
polygamous marriages, and (2) marriages considered to be incestuous
by the universal consent of Christendom. A third exception is some-
times recognized to that general rule in cases of marriages celebrated
In another state which are contrary to the public policy of the state as
embodied in a statute prohibiting such marriages." 3 A.L.R. 2d, 241.
1 Georgia v. Tutty, 41 Fed. 753 (1890); Dupre v. Boulard, 10 La.
Ann. 411 (1885); Babisso's Succession, 119 La. 704, 44 So. 438 (1907);
State v. Kennedy, 56 N.C. 251 (1897); Eggers v. Olson, 104 Okla. 297,
231 P. 483 (1924); Baker v. Carter, 180 Okla. 71, 56 P.2d -85 (1937).
11 Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota,
South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wyoming.
Is Idaho, Kentucky, Wyoming, Oregon, Colorado, and Utah.
DuKE BAR JOURNAL
If a miscegenous marriage has been consummated by resi-
dents of a state where such marriages are permitted, what
is the legal effect if the couple subsequently moves to a state
forbidding such marriages? Clearly, a state would be less
inclined to give effect to its anti-miscegenation statute in
this instance than in a case where there had initially been
an effort to evade the law. By statute, Colorado, Idaho,
Kentucky, Nebraska and Wyoming declare the marriage
valid in such eases; North Carolina achieves the same result
by decision. As the North Carolina Court put it:
"Our laws have no extra-territorial operation, and do
not attempt to prohibit the marriage in South Carolina
of blacks and whites domiciled in that state."14
The North Carolina court put an interesting twist on the
last statement by invoking the traditional rule that a wife
takes the domicile of her husband. Accordingly, it was
held that where a white woman had left North Carolina to
marry a Negro in a state where such marriages were per-
mitted, the marriage would be recognized in North Carolina,
since the wife's prior residence in North Carolina was super-
seded by her husband's domicile. Such a view opens the
door to marriage evasion in the numerically most frequent
type of racial intermarriage, that of a white woman and a
Negro man, if the Negro is from a state not forbidding
miscegenation.
Tennessee takes a contrary stand.15 Apparently, any
marriage between a Negro and a white person, regardless
of whether the parties were legally domiciled and married
in a state permitting miscegenation, will not be recognized
later in Tennessee. Perhaps this view brings Tennessee into
conflict with the Full Faith and Credit clause of the Con-
stitution, for if the parties have never lived in Tennessee,
no public policy of that state would seem to justify a refusal
to recognize the marriage for such purposes as descent of
property in Tennessee. The result would apparently hinge
on whether, for purposes of Full Faith and Credit, "mar-
riage" is a "public Act, record, or judicial proceeding."
1 State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242, 244 (1877).
State v. Bell, 7 Baxt. (Tenn.) 9 (1872).
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IV. Constitutional Law Problems
Prior to 1948 anti-miscegenation legislation had received
judicial approval on every encounter. Attacks on the valid-
ity or constitutionality of the statutes were successfully
parried by the courts.16 However, in 1948, the California
court in the case of Perez v. Lippold17 declared the California
anti-miscegenation statute unconstitutional. The question
of validity having been aroused from its constitutional slum-
ber, the query arises as to whether these statutes could sur-
vive a determined attack in the United States Supreme
Court.
One point of vulnerability was vagueness. Sociologically.
the line between white and colored is in some instances not
clear-cut; for instance, it was estimated as early as 1921
that almost 25,000 Negroes crossed the color line each
year.18 The California statute like that in a few other
western states failed to deal explicitly with these persons
15 Miscegenation statutes held 'constitutional: Dodson v. State, 61
Ark. 57 (1895); Green v. State, 58 Ala. 150 (1877); Ford v. State, supra;
Kirby v. Kirby, 24 Ariz. 9 (1932).
Held not to impair the obligation of contract provision of Art. 1,
Sec. 10 of the U. S. Constitution: In re Hobbs, 12 Fed. Cas. 6,550 (1871);
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1887), holding that marriage was not a
contract within the meaning of the prohibition; State v. Tutty, 41 Fed.
753 (1890); Dobson v. State, supra.
Held not to violate the equal protection clause of the 14th Amend-
ment of the U.S. Constitution: Green v. State, supra; State v. Gibson,
36 Ind. 389 (1890); State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175 (1880); In Re Paquet's
Estate, 101 Ore. 393 (1921); Jackson v. Denver, 190 Colo. 196 (1942).
Said the court in State v. Jackson, supra., at 177, "All of one's rights
as a citizen of the United States will be found guaranteed by the Con-
stitution of the United States. If any provision of that instrument
confers upon a citizen the right to marry anyone who is willing to wed
him, our attentioi has not been called to it."
IT 198 P. 2d 17 (1948). A white woman and a Negro man were de-
nied a marriage license on the basis of Civ. Code Sec. 69 which pro-
vided "... no license may be issued authorizing the marriage of a
white person with a Negro, mulatto, Mongolian, or member of the Malay
race." Civ. Code Sec. 60 provided: "All marriages of white persons
with Negroes, Mongolians, members of the Malay race or mulattoes are
illegal and void." No further definition, as to what percentage of blood
would render a person a member of the prohibited class, was given.
18 Hart, Hornell, Selective Migration As a Factor In Child Welfare
in the United States, With Special Reference to Iowa, University of Iowa
Studies in Child Welfare, vol. 1, First Series, 1921. Commented on in
American Journal of Sociology, LII, (July 1946), 18-22.
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changing races in mid-stream. For this reason, it was felt
to be vague; but this argument would presumably not apply
to the more specific provisions of most of the other states.
A more involved matter is the question of compatibility
with the equal protection clause of the United States Con-
stitution. In the past, relying on the 1896 cases of Plessy
v. Ferguson, the courts have refused to recognize that such
statutes violated the equal protection clause. 9 They sug-
gested that there was equality of application as to the two
races, since whites could not marry outside their race nor
Negroes outside their race. On the other hand, the Califor-
nia court in the Perez case treated equality of application
hot according to races but according to individuals. The
argument was followed there that an anti-miscegenation
law denies equal protection because A, a Negro, is forbidden
to marry B, a white; while C, a white, may lawfully marry
B. It is said to be irrevelant that A can marry some other
Negro.
Efforts have been made to justify the anti-miscegenation
statutes as measures designed to protect public peace, health
and welfare. For one thing these laws are said to prevent
breaches of peace that might occur under the impetus of
incidents of racial intermarriage. Such an argument, how-
ever, was rejected by the Supreme Court in Buchanan v. War-
" 163 U.S. 537 (1896). ". . . there is no discrimination where the
law applies equally to whites and to Negroes." The Plessy formula
has since been the vehicle of the anti-miscegenation cause. However,
there has been attenuation of the doctrine: The housing ordinance
cases, Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 69 (1917), Harmon v. Tyler, 273
U.S. 688 (1927), City of Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930). These
cases decided that using race or color as a basis for denying a person
equal enjoyment of property rights was discrimination, and in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution. More recently,
Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). The 1948 case of Shelly v.
Kraemer, 68 Sup. Ct. 826 rejected the equality of application doctrine
where property rights are concerned, "The rights created by the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed
to the individual. It is, therefore, no answer to these petitioners to say
that the court may also be induced to deny white persons rights of own-
ership and occupancy on the grounds of race or color. Equal protection
of the laws is not achieved through indiscriminate imposition of in-
equalities." In the education field the doctrine has been rejected
where substantial equality, in fact, has not been achieved. Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). In the transportation field, Henderson v.
U.S., 339 U.S. 816 (1950).
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Icy which dealt with the validity of zoning ordinances that
segregated according to race.20 Moreover, to accept this
argument would mean that a dominant group could justify
any discrimination by threatening to commit breaches of
the peace if the discrimination is removed.
The intimate relationship between the marital institution
and the basic welfare of the States has been relied upon to
justify close supervision by it of the matrimonial ventures
of its domiciliaries. Without speculating as to the physical
consequences of racial intermarriage,21 the writer suggests
that the sociological effects upon the offspring must be con-
sidered. It may well be argued that the state, as parens
patriae, has a privilege to bar marriage which would produce
problem progeny. To apply this principle one can consider
the situation of the child, of a mixed marriage.
If white and Negro intermarry, any children will nor-
mally be shunned by other whites if the child's parentage is
known; and the white parent may not be fully accepted by
his child's colored companions. Thus, a gap may develop in
the home. More important, under the state segregation
laws in many states the white parent will be barred by law
from associating with his child in restaurants, theaters, and
other public places. Will not the deprivation of the parent's
full companionship react adversely upon the child? This
suggestion emphasizes that regulation of the family must
take account of conditions of society with a view to produc-
ing normal children.
Apparently, in making this or other arguments to justify
anti-miscegenation laws, the state bears the burden of prov-
ing a rational basis for its statute. The usual presumption
in favor of constitutionality seems not to be indulged in
cases arising under the equal protection clause when funda-
2Supra.
22 The claims that certain races, especially the Negro, are biologically
inferior, and the progeny of racially divergent couples are likewise
inferior, found some support among early investigators of the subject.
The later studies generally tend to discredit such claims. It is signifi-
cant that in the Perez case, the minority cited the earlier studies, the
majority citing the latest studies available. The case contains a valua-
ble list of the more important studies made in this field. Attention is
called to one excellent work by Montague, Man's Most Dangerous Myth:
The Fallacy of Race, (1945).
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mental personal rights are involved.22 And marriage seems
in this category.23 Also exceptional circumstances are re-
quired to justify discrimination or classification of citizens
on the basis of racial descent.24
Conclusions
Social mobility and inter group contact--some of it fos-
tered by recent Supreme Court decisions-tend to produce
surroundings more conducive to miscegenation. Neverthe-
less test cases similar to Perez v. Lipold, challenging anti-
miscegenation laws, will probably come slowly to the courts
if at all. For one thing, potential plaintiffs are hard to find;
and few such persons would desire to suffer possible adverse
publicity and other consequences. In the Perez case the
parties were seeking by mandamus to compel issuance of a
license. But what if the state issues a license without pro-
test, relying solely on the penal provisions? Would there
be sufficient standing on the part of plaintiff to challenge
these penal provisions before marriage had subjected them
thereto? In view of this necessary risk of punishment it
is questionable that many persons would go through with
the marriage, even if convinced there was a constitutional
right to miscegenate. Also, few "civil rights" proponents
would be zealous enough in opposition to any statute to incur'
matrimonial entanglements in order to be in a position to
challenge the statute.
Thus, anti-miscegenation laws will probably remain on
the statute books. Perez v. Lippold may have been a defeat
W Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); Railway Mail Association v.
Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 337 (1947);
Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
This changing of the presumption arose in the cases involving lib-
erties protected under the First Amendment. See U.S. v. Carolene
Food Products, 304 U.S. , 147 (1938).
3 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 300 (1932); Pierce v. Society of Sister,
268 U.S. 510 (1925); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Said
the court in the Skinner case, "We are dealing with legislation which
involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation
are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." (Okla-
homa's sterilization statute was the legislation involved in that case.)
-1 Hirabayashi v. U.S., 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. U.S., 323
U.S. 214 (1944); Oyama v. California, supra.
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for proponents of miscegenation, for the decision of the
California court prevented recourse to the United States
Supreme Court; and thus, whatever "deplorable amalgama-
tion of races occurs" will continue to be through inter-breed-
ing rather than intermarriage.
JAMES R. BROWNING.
